* Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pursuing a hard-power-based regional strategy at odds with the Trump administration’s preferences for negotiated solutions to the region’s conflicts.
* The differing approaches will likely produce contention when Netanyahu visits Trump at his Mar-a-Lago retreat on December 29.
* Israel’s post-October 7 strategy is intended to try to thwart threats before they emerge, no matter the perceived intent of Israel’s adversaries.
* Trump’s team has expressed concerns that Israel’s policies will lead to a restart of the conflict in Gaza and destabilize governments in Lebanon, as well as post-Assad Syria
The visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-april-9/) to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago compound in South Florida — which will be his fifth in-person meeting with Trump in the United States — is still scheduled for December 29. However, as the visit approaches, the divergence between the two leaders seems to be widening rather than narrowing, potentially leading to substantial contention if the meeting goes forward as planned. The reported tensions between the two leaders — although both are committed to the close U.S.-Israel alliance — reflect their pursuit of vastly different regional strategies. The Trump team seeks to complete and institutionalize negotiated settlements of the region’s conflicts, particularly the two-year-long war in Gaza. In contrast, Israel has adopted a military-centered strategy intended to prevent any potential threat from gathering strength.
The divergence in the U.S. and Israeli approach was illustrated again last week, when reports emerged that Netanyahu plans to use the upcoming meeting in part to convince Trump that additional Israeli strikes on Iranian ballistic missile sites are necessary. The reports, including those by NBC News, indicate Israeli officials have grown increasingly concerned that Iran is expanding production of its ballistic missile program, which was damaged by Israeli military strikes during the Twelve Day War (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-august-5/) between the two regional powers in June. Israeli officials also believe Iran is reconstituting nuclear enrichment sites that the U.S. bombed in its Operation Midnight Hammer (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-23/) in June. Still, Israel currently views Iran’s rebuilding of its ballistic missile arsenal as the more immediate concern. Confirming the potential for any Israeli pre-emptive action to cause a regional conflagration,
last week, Iranian leaders reacted to the reports of Israeli consideration of renewed strikes by restating an intent to retaliate for any Israeli strikes with a massive missile barrage that Iran claims could cripple Israel’s military capability and its economy. Experts largely assess that Iran’s ability to cause damage inside Israel is significant, although to a lesser degree than Iran claims.
Some U.S. officials share Israel’s concerns about Iran’s missile capability (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-july-22/) , noting that last month, U.S. special forces boarded a ship in the Indian Ocean and intercepted a shipment of Chinese equipment intended to help Iran’s solid fuel production capability. Solid fuel production capacity was a key target of the Israeli air campaign in June. The NBC report suggests Netanyahu will present Trump with the option for the U.S. to join or assist any new Israeli attack on Iran. However, Trump continues to assert he seeks a negotiated nuclear agreement with Iran, and it is unlikely the U.S. would join any new Israeli attack unless clear evidence emerged that Iran was reconstituting or further advancing its nuclear program.
While Trump and his team seek to avoid another Iran-Israel war, they are more concerned with Israel’s strategy toward the several regional fronts in which Israeli military action might undermine U.S. diplomacy or partnerships. In Gaza, in particular, U.S. officials insist that the Israel-Hamas ceasefire that took effect in October under Trump’s 20 Point Plan (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-october-6/) be maintained. In recent statements on foreign policy, Trump has claimed that he settled the Gaza war and brought “peace to the Middle East.” A restart of the Gaza conflict would directly undermine Trump’s messaging, as well as derail any hopes of enlisting partner contributions to a Gaza peacekeeping force or to financing the rebuilding of the enclave.
Despite the risk of aggravating tensions with Trump, Netanyahu is sure to cite Hamas’ refusal to disarm as a cause to argue that Trump’s peace initiative has stalled, if not failed outright. Netanyahu and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir have insisted that if Hamas refuses to disarm, the IDF will restart combat to defeat the group militarily. Experts note that no regional or international leader has finalized a pledge of troops for the Trump plan’s International Stabilization Force (ISF) (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-december-16/) because they are hesitant to send forces into an unstable Gaza where Hamas still wields political power and armed force. For that reason, Hamas is also likely to draw peacekeepers into combat. As part of his effort to prevent Netanyahu from abrogating the ceasefire, Trump will argue he is close to securing ISF contributions and will soon establish the plan’s “Board of Peace” — an international body that will temporarily
supervise the postwar government in Gaza.
The Trump and Netanyahu teams are similarly at odds on Syria policy. Trump and his team view the post-Assad government of Ahmad al-Sharaa as a U.S. partner that can assume the burden of the anti-Islamic State (ISIS) mission (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-december-19/) in Syria and prevent Iran from reconstituting its influence in the country. Last week, U.S. and Syrian forces partnered on a key anti-ISIS mission, even though the after-action meetings resulted in the killing of three American personnel (two soldiers and a civilian interpreter) by a pro-ISIS member of the Syrian force. Syria is investigating the incident, and Trump publicly absolved the Syrian government and Sharaa of any responsibility for the attack. During his visit to Washington in November, Sharaa formalized Syria’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Last week, the U.S. Congress lifted the remaining major economic sanction on Syria — the Caesar Civilian Protection Act — which penalized any
U.S. or third-country firm that conducted significant transactions with Syrian state-owned entities.
Rather than building relations with Damascus, Israel is using hard power to signal that it will allow no threats — either from Syrian forces, Islamist foreign fighters allied with Damascus, or Hamas (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-october-17/) or Hezbollah (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-26/) — to assemble near Israel’s border with Syria. Israel conducts almost daily attacks on targets inside Syria in order to blunt perceived threats, keep Syria strategically weak, and carve out an expanded buffer zone in southern Syria. Sharaa has told journalists he is looking to Trump to compel Netanyahu to stop attacking inside Syria and to withdraw from the additional areas of the Golan Heights (annexed by Israel but recognized as Syrian territory) that Israel seized after Assad fell last December. Largely adopting Sharaa’s position, U.S. officials claim the Israeli interventions are undermining the new government and interfering with U.S. efforts to cement its
partnership with Syria.
At Mar-a-Lago, Trump is likely to counsel Netanyahu further not to restart major combat against Lebanese Hezbollah. As it does with respect to the Gaza conflict, Trump’s team argues that a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Hezbollah, should disarm. Hezbollah’s leader, Secretary-General Naim Qassem (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-november-4/) , has vowed the group will not disarm, but has acknowledged it was severely weakened by Israel’s offensive in 2024, and it has not retaliated for the near-daily Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets throughout Lebanon. However, Hezbollah remains strong enough to destabilize the Beirut government. Trump’s team views the Beirut government as a partner that shares its goals — the defeat of a militant organization — while recognizing that doing so requires patience and diplomacy to avoid sparking inter-communal conflict in Lebanon.
Counseling Netanyahu to avoid inflaming tensions inside Lebanon, Trump officials argue the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-june-23/) has largely eliminated Hezbollah’s infrastructure between the Litani River and the Israel border – in keeping with Resolution 1701 and the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire. Washington is urging Beirut to move faster on broader Hezbollah disarmament, while also accepting Beirut’s argument that Israel’s insistence on controlling several commanding heights in south Lebanon is undermining the government’s insistence that it is the sole defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty. The Israeli position is a stark illustration that, post-October 7, Israel views control over territory and key buffer zones as its only guarantee of protection — rejecting Trump’s arguments that broader Middle East peace is what will secure Israel in the long term.
https://x.com/TheSoufanCenter
