U.S. and Israel Diverge on Key Regional Files

Bottom Line Up Front
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* Differences between Israeli and U.S. leaders on key issues in the Middle East, particularly strategy toward Iran, might determine whether the region calms or flares into a broader conflagration.
* Trump insists that Israel support U.S. diplomacy with Tehran, backed by the threat of force, before the U.S. or Israel further considers military action against Iran.
* Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indicates he might, even without U.S. approval, use force to try to topple Iran’s regime or, at the very least, cripple its missile and other deterrent capabilities.
* Netanyahu is skeptical that Trump’s Gaza peace plan will succeed and has threatened to restart the war against Hamas if the group refuses to comply with the plan’s disarmament requirements.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pursue diplomacy instead of attacking Iran’s regime in the wake of the major uprising (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-12/) there has sharpened differences between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on major regional issues. Because Netanyahu asserts the right to undertake military action in the region even without specific U.S. approval, U.S. officials assess that they must take Netanyahu’s perspectives into account in formulating strategic policy in the region — and particularly on Iran. The consequences of U.S.-Israeli differences for the region can be stark: in 2025, the U.S. and Iran held five rounds of talks to forge a new nuclear accord, but on the eve of a sixth round, Israel launched a major air campaign against Iran (Operation Rising Lion) that derailed the U.S.-Iran diplomacy. Viewing the Israeli strikes as an opportunity to disable Iran’s nuclear program militarily, and facing perceived Iranian
intransigence at the negotiating table, Trump joined the Israeli effort. He ordered Operation Midnight Hammer — the U.S. bombing of the three key Iranian nuclear sites, including the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow that Israel was incapable of destroying. Iran retaliated with a missile strike (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-10/) on the large Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar that serves as the headquarters for U.S. air operations in the region.

Trump and Netanyahu are at odds on Iran policy again in 2026. Both leaders assess that their military action in June has, for now, crippled Iran’s nuclear program. They also agree that Israel’s post-October 7 military operations have severely damaged Iran’s ability to project power through its Axis of Resistance (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-18/) coalition of non-state armed actors. However, the two leaders are diverging over the threat posed by Iran’s missile arsenal, which U.S. intelligence assesses is the largest such arsenal in the Middle East, and which wrought considerable damage on Israeli civilian and some military targets during the Twelve Day War (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-23/) in June. Iranian missiles are capable of potentially striking U.S. allies and military personnel in the region, but cannot reach the U.S. mainland or even U.S. allies or assets in Europe. Israeli strategists, by contrast, express alarm that Iran is rebuilding
its missile and drone stockpile that was degraded last June, which can potentially cause massive damage inside Israel. According to a wide range of reports, President Trump’s comments last week that he might consider an agreement with Iran limited to nuclear issues, excluding any new limitations on Iran’s missile capabilities, caused Netanyahu to advance his visit to Washington to press Trump not to ease U.S. demands for a comprehensive agreement.

More broadly, Netanyahu and his team (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-december-22/) assess that the U.S. should exploit Iran’s recent setbacks — marked by the January uprising that demonstrated deep public dissatisfaction — to end the regime’s 47-year rule. Israeli officials acknowledge their target selection during the Twelve-Day War air campaign was intended, in part, to destabilize the regime, and claim they were compelled to end the effort by Trump’s insistence on a ceasefire. On Friday, Trump expressed his agreement with Netanyahu, in principle, telling reporters that regime change in Iran would be “the best thing that could happen.” His comment came as he continued to expand the U.S. presence in the region to give him the option of a weeks-long U.S. military operation to try to oust Iran’s leaders.

However, facing internal and regional doubts about the potential for — and the consequences of — U.S. military action to topple Iran’s regime, Trump has insisted to Netanyahu that the diplomatic option (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-2/) should be exhausted before further consideration of military options (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-23/) . Their differences were laid bare in their comments following a more than two-hour-long meeting last week. In a post on his social media site, Trump called it “a very good meeting,” but said “there was nothing definitive reached, other than I insisted that negotiations with Iran continue to see whether or not a Deal can be consummated. If it can, I let the Prime Minister know that will be a preference. If it cannot, we will just have to see what the outcome will be. Last time Iran decided that they were better off not making a Deal. Hopefully this time they will be more reasonable and responsible.” Admitting
he differs with Trump on Iran strategy, Netanyahu told reporters that, during their meeting, Trump “…wanted to hear my opinion. I won’t hide from you that I expressed general skepticism about the quality of any agreement with Iran. But I said that if an agreement is indeed reached, it must include elements that are very important to us, to Israel — and, in my opinion, not only to Israel.”

Recognizing that an open break with Trump on a major national security issue would be detrimental to Israel’s interests as well as to Netanyahu’s political standing, the Prime Minister expressed grudging support for exploring the diplomatic option. He told journalists: “I think that the conditions he [Trump] is creating, combined with the fact that they [Iranian leaders] surely understand they made a mistake last time by not reaching an agreement, could lead to the conditions for achieving a good deal.” At the same time, Netanyahu sought to influence the next round (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-9/) of U.S. discussions with Iran, which occurred yesterday in Geneva, by defining Israel’s Iran-related red lines expansively. He stated Israel insists that any agreement provide for Iran to end its enrichment of uranium, its development of ballistic missiles, and its support for its Axis of Resistance coalition partners. Netanyahu’s expressions of understanding for Trump’s
position yielded him some benefits. Axios reported Sunday that Trump signaled agreement with Netanyahu’s tougher line by agreeing that the U.S. will increase economic pressure on Iran, particularly on oil sales to China, which buys about 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, according to U.S. officials briefed on the issue. Reports indicate that the indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva yesterday ended with an agreement on a “set of guiding principles,” according to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Araghchi also stated that the two sides had agreed to exchange drafts for a potential deal.

Even though Netanyahu has bowed to Trump’s choices for now, regional leaders remain concerned about Israeli assertions that it reserves the right to take military action against Iran — with or without an explicit “green light” from Trump — if it perceives a gathering or imminent threat. Israeli officials have defined one of those potential triggers as further Iranian efforts to rebuild its missile arsenal and launch infrastructure that was degraded by Israel in the 2025 war. Regional leaders, as well as some U.S. officials, question whether Trump will be able to restrain Israel. Regional officials cite Israel’s attack (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-16/) on a Hamas leadership meeting in Doha in September, which undermined Qatari mediation of the conflict in Gaza, as one example of the adverse consequences of Israel’s assertion of its freedom of action.

The Trump-Netanyahu divergence on Iran adds to their friction over the prospects for the Trump peace plan for Gaza to reassure Israel that it no longer faces a threat from Hamas. In his social media posts reading out their meeting, Trump affirmed he and Netanyahu had “also discussed the tremendous progress being made in Gaza, and the Region in general” — a reference to U.S. efforts to advance Phase II of the U.S. peace plan for Gaza. But as an indication of his skepticism about the purported progress, Netanyahu is not returning to the U.S. this week for the Wednesday meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-11/) , which oversees the implementation of the Gaza peace plan. Netanyahu will not join the meeting even though he confirmed during his visit to Washington that Israel had formally signed the Board’s charter. Israel was not an original signer of the charter at the Trump-led inaugural meeting of the body on the sidelines of the World
Economic Forum in Davos. Israel had expressed to the Trump team some reservations about the U.S. inclusion on the Board of several regional states, particularly Türkiye, that Israel considers insufficiently committed to Hamas’s disarmament.

In his meeting with Trump, Netanyahu undoubtedly cited recent statements by Hamas leaders that the group would not disarm (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-october-17/) , as required by the Trump peace plan. Israel insists on disarmament, as well as dismantlement of Hamas’ military production, infrastructure, and tunnels, as a condition of withdrawing from the half of Gaza Israel still controls. Israel insists not only on complete Hamas demobilization, but it is also pressing the Trump team to insist that Hamas fighters be forced to leave Gaza entirely. The New York Times last week seemed to affirm Israeli concerns that the Trump team might not implement the disarmament requirement to Israel’s standards, reporting the U.S. is demanding Hamas surrender all weapons that are capable of striking Israel, but would allow the group to keep some small arms, at least initially. One expert, Shira Efron, chair of Israel policy at the RAND Corporation, characterized Hamas disarmament as
central to completing the Gaza peace plan. She told journalists that demilitarization is “the linchpin of everything…If it doesn’t happen, we could end up with two Gazas, one run by Israel and the other by Hamas, or a return to a fully-fledged war.”

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