As the 17th week of the Gaza war begins: Where will Israel go in light of the US agenda and its incompatibility with Netanyahu’s vision?

By: Antoine Shalhat is a Palestinian/Israeli citizen Writer, journalist, and translator. and an Israeli affairs expert

With the beginning of the seventeenth week of the Israeli war of destruction and genocide in the Gaza Strip, the interest has increased more and more in Israel in the following: 1- The results achieved on the path of achieving the goals set for it; 2- The anatomy of the behavior of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, what he seeks and aspires towards, the motives behind this, and its incompatibility with what is circulating on the “American agenda” of the war; 3- A study of the extent to which condoning or reluctant to adopt a plan for what is described as the “day after” of the war constitutes an obstacle to the possibility of achieving a strategic achievement of the battles.

These are all topics that will be addressed in more detail in this contribution.

1- The explosion in Maghazi:

Although the circumstances of the killing of 21 Israeli reservists in the explosion that occurred in Al-Maghazi camp on January 22 remain vague, the most prominent conclusions about it included linking it to the latest developments in the war, the conduct of the battles and their consequences, foremost of which is that the Palestinian resistance elements in the Gaza Strip are still close to the border area with Israel. Most of those conclusions were not independent of asserting what appears to be a near-consensus about the intractable of the war. According to all Israeli military analysts, the reserve formations were combing the area where the explosion occurred to turn it into a security belt between the borders of the Strip and its suburbs. The point in kind where the explosion occurred is 600 meters from the border, about a kilometer from Kibbutz, but “Hamas fighters could have fired sniper or anti-armor shells and mortar bombs without any inconvenience,” asserts the chief military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai (“Yedioth Ahronoth,” 23/1/2024), who added that the killing of the 21 soldiers could undermine the legitimacy that the Israeli public gives to the war. In many other analyses, it is pointed out that the incident, which killed 21 reservists, will add to the arguments of the right, led by the Likud Party, that the fighting in the Gaza Strip should continue. Defence Minister Yoav Galant said that “the fall of the fighters forces us to achieve the goals of the war,” thus summing up the arguments of the right. The representatives of the right also continue to repeat the message that the continuation of the war is a fundamental necessity for the security of Israel and its population, and the offensive operation in Khan Younis, which began in recent days, is the actual content of this speech. But despite the operation in Khan Younis, the most important since the IDF moved into the third phase of the fighting, and the high-tone rhetoric in the government, there is also a civilian movement opposed to the continued fighting, as most analyses in Haaretz confirm. According to one of these analyses (by Rafit Hecht, 24/1/2024), increasing awareness about the issue of the kidnapped, the increase in sympathy with their families, as well as the continuation of public talk about the high prices can certainly strengthen this movement, and cannot infiltrate the government, even if it is difficult at this stage to understand the magnitude of its power.

2- Netanyahu will remain at stake:

The articles confirm that Benjamin Netanyahu did the longest term in this position throughout Israel’s history, and he continues to boast that his term longer than that of the founder of the state, David Ben-Gurion, will be confined to an “introductory chapter” within his autobiography, and will be taught in history classes under the title “Factors and motives that led to the tragedy of October 7, 2023,” as asserted by Haaretz editor-in (27/1/2024).

In the days since the previous issue last week, an increased focus on Netanyahu’s performance was observed in everything related to bilateral relations between Israel and the United States, in light of the phone conversation between him and US President Joe Biden a month after the break between them. In the opinion of Amos Harel, a military analyst for Haaretz (22/1/2024), and others of course, this phone conversation was supposed to signal an improvement in relations. However, the two contradictory statements issued by both the White House and the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office regarding this conversation point to the depth of the disparity between the two parties. According to Harel, the Biden administration continues to insist not only on giving the Palestinian Authority in Gaza a role in the day after the war but on a “two-state solution.” However, Netanyahu is entrenching his renewed political positioning in the domestic arena, building his hopes that he will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. This is his new card, after he attempted to confer on himself the status of “master of security” permanently collapsed in the attack carried out by Hamas. Netanyahu’s public pulse towards Biden also serves his domestic political efforts to restore the voices of right-wingers, largely. However, it is not at all certain that this movement will help him, given that Hamas has not been defeated in the war so far.

As for the most prominent Israeli expert in American affairs, Professor Eitan Ghalboa, (“Maariv”, 21/1/2024), confirms that the two conflicting statements issued by President Biden’s office and Netanyahu regarding their phone conversation indicate a growing disagreement between the United States and Israel over the “day after the war.” Biden said Netanyahu has not refused to establish a Palestinian state, and there is still a chance of reaching an agreement on the matter. Netanyahu replied: “In any agreement for the foreseeable future, Israel must control all the territory west of the Jordan River. This goes against the idea of Palestinian sovereignty, and I say this to the Americans.” In a reading of Ghalboua, Netanyahu’s rejection of Biden’s vision of a Palestinian state is a particularly sensitive nerve for the Democratic Party in the United States, and the emergence of angry voices from Congress was not late. Recently, the parties exchanged criticisms and spoke in particular to their bases. Netanyahu challenged Biden when he said he was the only one who could say “no” to the president of the United States, and block the establishment of a Palestinian state. And that seems to be the basic slogan he will use in his upcoming election battle. The White House has leaked that it is working on a new Marshall Plan in Gaza “the next day.” The Biden administration assumes that elections will be held in Israel soon, and Netanyahu will not win them. But when Biden compares Hamas’ rejection to the Israeli government’s rejection, he specifically strengthens Netanyahu.

Ghalboa points out that since the beginning of the war, the Biden administration has been pressing Netanyahu to decide who will control a civilian in Gaza, should Hamas be expelled from there. This is also the position of the Israeli army, because the answer is very necessary for the continuation of military operations. Not only has Netanyahu not responded, he even refuses to discuss the issue in the government. Biden believes that the main reason for this is Netanyahu’s desire to maintain his government coalition with Ben-Gvier and Smotrich, so he has submitted to their extremist positions calling for the occupation of the entire sector, the voluntary migration of residents, and the return of Jewish settlement there. Biden also has to think about the presidential election. Netanyahu’s statements against the vision of a Palestinian state have led to dangerous responses from Congress, which could affect, not only the “day after,” but also the continued war.

The Democratic Party’s progressive wing is pressing Biden to require U.S. military assistance to Israel with the Israeli government’s willingness to accept a “two-state solution” in principle. Progressives use a law that requires the use of U.S. weapons to be compliant with U.S. law, and the laws of humanitarian and international war. Because Netanyahu rejected the Palestinian state, the number of senators who want to require U.S. military assistance to Israel has risen from 12 to 18, and even the 15 Jewish members of the U.S. House of Representatives sharply criticized Netanyahu, stating “We are strongly opposed to the prime minister, and the two-state solution is the way forward.” Without congressional approval, the US president cannot send a weapon to Israel. Despite all this, Galboa concludes that Netanyahu is more keen on his government coalition than on Israel’s security and relations with the Americans.

According to a position paper issued by the Institute for National Security Research at Tel Aviv University prepared by Major General Eldad Shafit, who worked in the Military Intelligence Division (AMAN) and was the former head of the Research Department of the Israeli Presidency of the Israeli Government and the former head of the intelligence field in the Office of the Military Secretary of both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence (22/1/2024), the statement issued by the White House on 19/1/2024, after the telephone conversation between Biden and Netanyahu, contains a summary of the main issues that are at the heart of the “American agenda”, which are the following issues:

First, in terms of the war effort: the US administration sees the need to continue military pressure on Hamas and its leadership in the Strip and welcomes the change in Israeli action from a large-scale manoeuvre to specific campaigns, time, and geographically. The administration remains steadfast in its position that a ceasefire should not be imposed on Israel, something that will help Hamas return to the accumulation of its power, from this administration’s point of view. But contrary to statements by the White House at the beginning of the fighting, it seems that the US administration no longer emphasizes the goal of defeating Hamas, but is content with general statements, that this movement will not be able in the future to repeat the attack of October 7. In parallel, the administration is signaling that it continues to work to ensure that Israel has everything it needs to defend itself. The administration appreciates that the continuation of the fighting on low heat mitigates the risk of deterioration toward an all-out war with Hezbollah.

Second, increase humanitarian aid and prevent harm to civilians.

Third, the release of Israeli abductees detained in Gaza.

Fourth, the post-war phase: In the White House announcement, following the call between Netanyahu and Biden, it was confirmed that “the president also discussed his vision for achieving more peace, security, and stability for Israel by deepening its integration in the region upon reaching an agreement within the framework of a two-state solution.” The main message from the US administration is that there is a real opportunity to accelerate the process of normalization between Israel and the Arabs, led by Saudi Arabia. Addressing the Davos Economic Conference, U.S. National Security Adviser Jack Sullivan presented the vision Biden discussed with Netanyahu, which reflects the U.S. belief that war should lead to a regional reality that guarantees security for Israel and an independent state for the Palestinians.

According to the paper, the US administration believes, as understood by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, that the burden of proof regarding the transformation of the war in Gaza into an opportunity to reshape the Middle East, rests with Israel, while it recognizes, for the first time, perhaps, the readiness of the Arab side for it. But this readiness is conditional on advancing a solution to the Palestinian issue. The administration expects that Israel will provide it with a thread that will enable it to push in the direction of its political vision, but so far, it seems that the administration is seeing that Israel is slow in responding to this request. Therefore, the administration does not hesitate to express its frustration, particularly through leaks to the American media. It can be appreciated that Biden does not intend to surrender, that his pressure on Israel will increase, and that this estimate has not changed after the Biden-Netanyahu call. The president even told reporters afterward that “it’s not impossible to achieve a two-state solution, even when Netanyahu is in power. There are different types of a two-state solution. There are UN member states, and they do not have an army. Other countries have been restricted. So, I think some ways can be done to ensure that this works.” While Biden continues to show his strong support for Israel, and he does not drift behind the claim that began to rampant among Democratic congressmen demanding that U.S. aid be required to Israel with its positive response to political initiatives, the complex reality of Biden’s campaign and congressional elections, a confrontation that is expected to be severe, will reduce the president’s room for maneuver if he faces difficulties in delivering political achievements in his foreign policies.

Against this background, the paper concludes that we must take into account that the US administration, although the US administration has so far refrained from using tools to pressure Israel, appreciates that the Israeli government is unwilling to cooperate with it on moving towards a public plan on the “day after the war,” which may carry negative projections on the president’s willingness to continue to pay attention to defending Israel’s positions and aiding it in the war.

3- In the importance of discussing the “day after” of the war:

Many Israeli analyses confirm that the Netanyahu government’s reluctance at its behest to discuss the “day after” of the war goes hand in hand with avoiding talking about a comprehensive strategy. According to, for example, Major General Reserve Gadi Shimni, military secretary of both former prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, those who avoid talking about “the day after” and comprehensive strategy assume that the army will succeed alone, or there will be an accumulation of tactical successes, and in the end, this will lead to a strategic achievement. In his opinion, this cannot happen. He continued: “In the Second Lebanon War (2006), we said to ourselves that whenever we accumulate tactical achievements, this will give us a strategic achievement, and this did not happen” (Israel TV Channel 12 website, 24/1/2024).

Shimeni believes that formulating a strategy at the political level requires the participation of the United States, as well as talking about the “day after”, which will direct the military operations of the military in a way that pushes to achieve strategic goals that the political level has not yet known. He also believes that dismantling Hamas is an important goal but ultimately this is not a strategy that can expect 50 years or 100 years forward.

As for the conduct of the battles themselves, Shimni believes that the most important central problems that exist now are the fact that Israel does not exist in the Philadelphia axis (Salah al-Din axis) on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. According to his reading along with the readings of a large number of Israeli military analysts, if Israel does not reach the Philadelphia axis, it will not be able to cut the tunnel line “in which weapons and activists flow.”

In this particular axis, the American newspaper “The Wall Street Journal” confirmed that the war on Gaza imposed new calculations on Egyptian-Israeli relations and caused the transformation of relations between the two parties “from just tension to a stage of collapse.” The newspaper returned the reasons for this slippage about Egypt’s warning of the displacement of large numbers of Palestinians from Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula while Israel continues its war in Gaza, in addition to the decline in traffic in the Suez Canal, which exacerbated the situation. She also pointed out that Israel recently tried to get Egypt to accept an Israeli military presence in the Philadelphia axis under the pretext of preventing Hamas from smuggling weapons across the border, which Egypt rejected because it was a violation of its sovereignty.

Cairo asserts that it fully controls the border and has repeatedly rejected Israeli accusations of allowing weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. Egypt has on several occasions revealed Israel’s intention to displace Gazans from their land towards the Sinai territories and stressed its rejection of these practices.

This research was published in Arabic by The Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (MADAR).

English translation by Apple translation service. 

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