By: Walid Habbas
This article is a new field in a series of articles in which we addressed Israeli discussions about the political arrangements for the day after the war. With the transition from a policy of “containing Hamas by deterring it” (2007-2023) to a policy of “dismantling Hamas’s authoritarian and combat capabilities” (the current war goals), Israel expects an authoritarian vacuum in the Strip the day after the war. This “expected” vacuum has sparked Israeli debates about what future government Israel favours. It must be emphasised that the discussion we review below reflects Israeli views based on what is best for Israel in theory, and not based on practical indicators that indicate whether or not to apply it.
The ideas below are a reading from the Strategic Thinking Group within the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, a Think Tank that provides political and security recommendations to Israeli decision-makers, promotes pragmatic policies that will maintain Israel’s security and believes that they lead in the long term to stable political arrangements. It is a right-wing institute based on the “priority of security” in concluding political agreements with the Palestinians.
The scale of the destruction in the Gaza Strip determines the shape of the political governance system.
Most of the Israeli discussions about the day after the war arrangements include that the Gaza Strip must remain in the area of Israeli control, and therefore, exclude options that we can describe as a road map for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and in return on the best ways in which Israel can continue to “manage the occupied population.” Based on this dominant trend within Israel, the Jerusalem Institute’s research team for Strategy and Security (later to be referred to as “researchers”) believes that Israel’s options in managing the lives of the Strip’s residents the day after the war are:
There is a government vacuum in managing the life of the Strip in the wake of the depletion of Hamas’s authoritarian capabilities and a premature withdrawal of the Israeli army.
The Palestinian Authority and its security forces currently operating only in the West Bank are returned to the Gaza Strip. This option, also called for by US administration chairman Joe Biden, who required a “fundamental change” in the PA.
A temporary international or Arab guardianship system under the auspices of the United Nations forces.
Reproducing the mechanisms of direct occupation, through which Israel meets the civilian needs of the population of the Gaza Strip through a military council as it was before the establishment of the Civil Administration in 1981, which the United States does not favour as a “reoccupation.”
Creation of a new, politicized technocrat system headed by Palestinian figures with a popular presence.
Researchers at the Jerusalem Institute believe that these options are no longer in the form of an “open question,” but rather that the seeds of an answer to them began to be instilled by the war cabinet, and they currently constitute one of the objectives of the ground military operation in the Strip. In addition to the two prominent military objectives of the military operation (ending Hamas’ military capabilities, and returning Israeli prisoners), there is another goal to turn the Gaza Strip into a space on the brink of a humanitarian disaster that may require, indispensably, a new-style regime to address this humanitarian disaster, and to take the affairs of the residents of the Strip in a space where, because of the destructive military strikes, there is no life capabilities.
Thus, any future Palestinian authority on the Gaza Strip has to deal with mass destruction, as most of the northern part of the Gaza Strip is no longer fit for human habitation and will remain so for a long time. The civilian population will not be able to access adequate health services, and education, health and employment systems will work very partially. Hence, the almost total destruction of the sector turns into a “password” that will determine who is the Palestinian party that is actually capable of reconstructing the Strip and pumping civilian life into it from a point almost close to zero. Here, “semi-universal destruction” turns into a strategic tool in the hands of Israel, which should only withdraw from the Strip with two conditions:
The existence of a new authority does not pose a security or political threat to Israel. The intended threat includes not only the security-military aspect (such as the presence of an armed resistance structure as it was before October 7), but also the lack of “political incitement” against Israel (for example, the existence of inflammatory education curricula, or legislation to host the families of prisoners and martyrs as is currently practised in the West Bank).
The new authority abandons security sovereignty in favour of Israel so that the latter has “absolute freedom” in military action throughout the Gaza Strip.
Technocrats are better than political parties!
She has developed many political perceptions regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, and suggested Palestinian names to stand at the head. Mentioning these people may not matter as much as analysing the logic behind this strategic thinking. In this context, researchers who present their studies as proposals to Israeli decision-makers argue that the Israeli experience with the PLO, and the Palestinian Authority in particular, is a bad and failed one. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the PA has been inflammatory and hostile to Israel. Although Joe Biden did not explain what is meant by the need for a fundamental change in the work of the Palestinian Authority, Israeli researchers are of the view that the authority that Israel must deal with on the day after the war must put at the top of its task a complete change in the educational curriculum (to ensure a new generation of Palestinians is more “tolerant), and to immediately stop paying salaries to Palestinian “terrorists” whether prisoners or families of martyrs. Nor should the new authority be a political player willing to challenge Israel in international bodies or oversee campaigns to delegitimize it in various international forums.
These conditions may not be met in an authority headed by a Palestinian political organisation, but “it would be right to try to build a Palestinian civil technocratic system of government as a new model.” Only a technocratic government, according to Israeli researchers, will be able to continue to manage the affairs of the Palestinians, which may be responsible and professional enough to take over the reins of power in the Gaza Strip. Israeli researchers advise that this technocratic authority should meet the following conditions:
The concepts of the right of return and admiration of armed struggle should not be part of the culture or spirit of the new power. To this end, all formations that perpetuate the Palestinian refugee issue must be dismantled, such as dismantling the camps, replacing them with new residential neighbourhoods and ending UNRWA services. There is no justification for the continued existence of these two institutions (the camp and UNRWA) systematically raising the awareness of refugees that they are still refugees.
The second condition is that this authority is professionally acceptable and free from the structures of corruption and nepotism. This condition points to one aspect of the failure of the Oslo Accords that allowed billions of dollars to flow in favour of the Palestinians. Instead of the existing Palestinian Authority disbursing it to reshape the Palestinian socio-cultural landscape and turn it into a non-political and non-aggressive one towards Israel, this authority has been interested in channeling the money into pockets it does not deserve. Thus, a non-politicised technocratic authority, not resembling the existing power structures, may be able to gain the trust of the international community that will finance the Gaza Strip the day after the war.
The strategic goal of the new authority should be a civil dismantling from the State of Israel with comprehensive security subordination to it. According to the formula used by the group of researchers, civil dismantling does not mean liberating from Israel’s security control or restricting its ability to military action within the Strip in the future. In contrast, civil dissentment means reducing the administrative dependence of the residents of the Strip on Israel in the provision of public services such as electricity, energy, water and labour markets. This means that the reality of coordination and linkage currently followed with the Gaza Strip (but also with the West Bank) is no longer an appropriate option for the continuation of the relationship between the Palestinians and Israel.
These ideas remain mere proposals, though they come from researchers who consider themselves experts in Israel’s national security and with various links with Israeli decision-makers. However, the Israeli prime minister has made clear that the ruling Palestinian Authority in the West Bank “will not have a foothold in Gaza,” at least the day after the war. Biden has conditioned her return to the sector with a material change. Accordingly, the researchers recommend that the new authority established in Gaza operate independently and is not affiliated with the authority established in the West Bank.
This is an Apple Translation of the Arabic version of an opinion published by The Palestinian Centre for Israeli Studies “MADAR”, is an independent research center specialized in Israeli affairs, based in the city of Ramallah. Founded in the year 2000.