| As Phase One of the January Israel-Hamas ceasefire and hostage and prisoner exchanges concludes Monday, negotiations to implement the subsequent phases of the accord, intended to end the conflict in Gaza permanently, appear stalled. The crux of the disagreements – within Hamas and among Arab leaders – center on the future political and military activities of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Arab leaders who will attempt to finalize an Egypt-drafted postwar plan at a Tuesday summit meeting in Cairo appear to recognize that Israel and the U.S. insist the group has no recognized political or military role in postwar Gaza. Yet, there is also a regional understanding that Hamas retains a critical mass of armed strength as well as popular support inside Gaza despite 17 months of intense Israeli operations. The complexities of addressing Hamas’ future have led Israel and the United States to call for a 42-day extension of Phase One, including additional releases of the approximately 65 remaining Israeli hostages (of which perhaps half are believed still alive) and Palestinian prisoners. Hamas has signaled openness to that proposal, which would buy time to reach a consensus on the core outstanding issues.
Within Hamas, a debate is intensifying over the group’s role in postwar Gaza – recognizing that defining Hamas’ role, if any, in postwar Gaza is central to ending the war and rebuilding the devastated physical and social infrastructure of the territory. Some Hamas political leaders, based in the region but outside Gaza, have told journalists they accept the group will have to give up overtly ruling Gaza if the enclave is to be rebuilt with foreign country donations. However, according to Arab intelligence and Hamas officials, hard-liners within the group – mostly leaders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the military wing of the organization) – insist on remaining as an armed force that can exert influence behind the scenes and potentially return to fighting Israel. These same sources report the internal debate has intensified to the point where some Hamas political leaders have considered breaking with the group’s military leaders in Gaza. The extent of the internal debate became clear last week from the comments of one high-ranking Hamas Political Bureau leader, Mousa Abu Marzuq, casting doubt on the wisdom of launching the October 7, 2023 incursion into Israel. He told the New York Times: “If it was expected that what happened would happen, there wouldn’t have been October 7,” as far as he was concerned. His position indicated that some Hamas leaders have been influenced by complaints from Palestinians in Gaza who say the war that resulted from the October 7 attack has made them endure extraordinary suffering.
Building on his argument, Abu Marzuq suggested there was some willingness within Hamas to disarm in postwar Gaza – taking a position that not only Gaza’s military wing but also some other Hamas political officials have rejected. Attempting to mask the internal dissent, immediately after Abu Marzuq’s comments were published, a Gaza-based Hamas spokesperson issued a statement saying Hamas is committed to armed conflict with Israel and praising the October 7 attack. And, Husam Badran, another member of the group’s Political Bureau, told journalists: “Hamas is a unified movement at home and abroad.”
Observations on the ground in Gaza indicate that, despite the inclination of more moderate Hamas leaders to emphasize diplomacy and political action rather than insurgency, the group’s leaders in Gaza show few signs of offering concessions. According to numerous reports, Hamas’ military wing expects talks over a war termination to falter, and it is regrouping its military forces for a potential return to fighting against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza. According to former IDF commanders, Qassam leaders reportedly have recruited at least 4,000 new fighters over the past few months and appointed new commanders to replace those killed by IDF operations. According to Arab officials who talk with Hamas, the group has begun mapping out where to position fighters in the event of a return to war, repurposing unexploded munitions into improvised explosive devices (IEDs), repairing its underground tunnel network, and instructing new fighters on how to use weapons to mount a guerrilla war. Arab intelligence officials have told journalists that Izz al-Din Haddad, Hamas’ military head in northern Gaza, met in early February with his subordinates to “war game” how a renewed Israeli attack might unfold, warning that Israel would first move to retake the strategic Netzarim Corridor dividing the strip.
The group is also resisting Arab planning to marginalize it politically, suggesting the group’s leaders continue to envision Hamas as the dominant force in determining the course of the Palestinian national movement. The group reportedly is asserting administrative control over civilian matters, in part by directing Hamas police forces to secure aid deliveries by humanitarian organizations. In February, Hamas leaders in Gaza called on students and teachers to return to those schools that remain intact. The Hamas-run housing ministry in Gaza said it was conducting assessments of the number of homes destroyed during the conflict.
Hamas’ seeming insistence on remaining both politically and militarily prevalent in Gaza has thwarted Arab efforts to reach a consensus on a plan to stabilize and eventually rebuild Gaza. Arab leaders met in Saudi Arabia last week and will meet on Tuesday in Egypt to try to finalize an Egypt-drafted roadmap to rebuild Gaza and set the stage for permanent peace with Israel. The drafters have sought to calibrate their plan to address Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s insistence – backed by Trump and his foreign policy team – that Hamas no longer play a military or political role in the enclave.
Viewing any plan not aligned with American and Israeli positions as non-viable, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is vocally refusing to participate financially or physically in postwar Gaza unless Hamas is excluded from Gaza’s governing body and surrenders its weapons. It instead wants a reformed PA to be recognized as the sole legitimate governing body for Gaza – returning to its role there before its expulsion by Hamas militants in 2007. Expressing the UAE government policy, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan, told last week’s “Investopia 2025” conference in Abu Dhabi: “You know, you can’t just go and sort of invest billions without that political clarity and come back to see yet another conflict. I think that position is very clear.” But, stating the position of all Arab leaders, Gargash insisted any Gaza reconstruction plan requires a clear path to a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia’s leaders have also expressed resistance to contributing to Gaza reconstruction as long as the prospects for the war to resume are significant.
Recognizing that Hamas militants retain enough strength to spoil any postwar governance and reconstruction plans that exclude the group, Saudi Arabia and Qatar back Egypt’s efforts to forge a middle ground. Egypt’s draft allows the group to play a political role in running postwar Gaza along with PA leaders. Backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt has encouraged talks between Hamas and the PA to form an independent committee of technocrats that would run Gaza while it is being rebuilt. Hamas officials have indicated general support for the Egyptian proposal but have made clear to mediators they remain at odds with PA leaders. Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders oppose inviting the PA back to run Gaza, arguing it supports militant actions against Israel, but Israel has not offered any alternative plan to that being developed by Egypt. In addition, while demanding Hamas and other Palestinian militants surrender their missiles and rockets that could be used to attack Israel, the Egyptian plan does not set up an Arab peacekeeping force to secure the enclave. That omission reflects Arab leaders’ reluctance to subject their forces to likely challenges from Hamas militants that will still operate in the enclave. |
