In his comments on the start of the ground operation in the Gaza Strip, U.S. President Joe Biden said: “There must be a vision of what is to come after the war… From our point of view there should be a two-state solution.” Since the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began, the path of a “two-state solution” has been shelved until the Palestinians are united under one leadership. Today, after Israel has set itself a war goal of “the overthrow of Hamas from power in Gaza,” three unanswered questions arise: 1) Is this goal viable? 2) If applied, what is the political future of the sector? 3) Will this political future, which is still unclear, move the “two-state solution” file from the shelf to put it as a merit before the Israeli government again?
It is difficult to find clear Israeli answers to these questions. But this paper wanders among these questions and aims to explain and dismantle the doctrine that organized Israel’s relationship with the Gaza Strip before October 7, a doctrine based on obstructing the path of a two-state solution. The paper attempts to consider the invariant and mutant in this doctrine.
How did Israel’s relationship with the Gaza Strip develop after Oslo 1993?
Without neglecting the decades-long historical relationship (the majority of the Strip’s population is Nakba refugees), one of the most important entry points to understanding the current relationship between Israel and the Gaza Strip is a return to the Oslo Accords signed in 1993. Since that period, the sector has gone through several successive stages, which can be summarized as follows:
Unlike the West Bank, which was divided into areas “A”, “B” and “C”, the Gaza Strip was divided into only two parts: Palestinians were granted administrative and security authority over large parts of the Gaza Strip, while Israel continued to control three settlement blocs within the Strip, the largest of which is Gush Katif, southwest of the Strip.
During the years 1993-2000, the Oslo Accords and its annexes carried many promises related to the sector, including the construction of a seaport (not inaugurated), an airport (already built and operated), as well as a land corridor linking it with the West Bank (not inaugurated), until the Second Intifada (2000-2004).
Israeli settlements in the Strip received repeated and painful attacks during the Second Intifada until Ariel Sharon decided to fully withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005. This was a unilateral withdrawal by Israel and ended with the imposition of a land, sea and air blockade on the Gaza Strip, including its population.
After the implementation of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Strip (for a very short period of time, 2005-2007) turned into an area A in the West Bank. In this period there was one Palestinian authority, an authority that was exhausted by the Al-Aqsa Intifada and working to rearrange its internal house after the death of Yasser Arafat and the assumption of its leadership by Mahmoud Abbas.
The major shift in Israel’s relationship with the Gaza Strip was in 2006 when Hamas won the majority of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (the last time that Palestinian legislative elections were held), and then in 2007 when the dispute between Fatah and Hamas led to a Palestinian political division that led to the exit of PA forces from the territory that came under the authority of Hamas.
It is necessary to focus on two shifts in Israel’s relationship with the Strip after the unilateral withdrawal (2005) and Hamas’ control of the Strip (2007): The first shift is that Israel unilaterally imposed the Israeli withdrawal without including it in the Oslo Accords (as is customary with regard to withdrawal or redeployment), creating a new situation that needs to be framed within the official relationship between Israel and the PLO. The second shift is that after 2007, Israel imposed a land blockade (from all sides), air (the Gaza airport was destroyed) and by sea, so that the “management of the Strip” is done through the dicholution/tightening of the blockade, along with the independent Israeli liaison office for Gaza.
How did Israel’s relationship with the Gaza Strip develop after the 2007 Palestinian split?
Dr. points out Mikhail Milstein, head of the Department of Palestine Studies at the Moshe Dayan Center and a senior researcher at right-wing Reichmann University, noted that Israel forged its relationship with the Gaza Strip after the Palestinian division through “trial and error” as follows:
The first period extended between 2007-2014, as Israel diagnosed this period as a sudden period for which it did not prepare. Hamas was learning what it meant to be a “governor” and oversee education, health, employment, and population management. On the other hand, Israel was learning how to organize its relationship with the Palestinians in the presence of two authorities, so that Israel needed time to understand that “Hamas in power” could be a useful scenario for it in the long run as it postponed the two-state solution indefinitely. In this period, three rounds of fighting took place between Israel and Hamas.
The second period, according to Milstein, spanned from 2014 (after the end of the “Eating Storm”) combat round through 2021. This period was characterized, for Israel, by Hamas seeking a “fair” reconciliation with Ramallah, or getting closer to the Egyptian regime. But it was also a period of “war of attrition” regarding Hamas’s relationship with Israel, punctuated by return marches and tensions on the border with Israel, as well as sporadic fighting rounds.
The third period (which Milstein calls the settlement period) began between 2020-2021, where the Israeli military and intelligence leadership believed that Hamas failed in the war of attrition, and that it became burdensome under the pressure of the Gazan street, and therefore both Israel and Hamas went to settle the relationship between them on the basis of “calm for calm” – the equation that Israel tried to establish from the beginning to strengthen the Palestinian division.
Hence, the Israeli doctrine was formed in its most obvious form: the depletion of Hamas and its inability to achieve reconciliation (2014-2021), which made it in front of two options: either to “suicide” politically because of the war of attrition (2014-2021), which included violent Israeli attacks to destroy the Strip, or to turn into a power party and thus prepare for a long-term period of rule during which it will be able to develop administratively and authoritarianally, provided that it obliterated the “jihadist” dimension in its political identity and make it in a secondary or “pros” position.
What is the Israeli doctrine behind the concept of “calm versus calm”?
The “calm versus quiet” equation is usually associated with Israeli governments headed by Benjamin Netanyahu (specifically between 2009-2021), and later (after December 2022). Regardless of how Israel or Hamas sees this equation, it has become clear that the concept of “calm versus calm” is based on an Israeli doctrine (in Hebrew “conception” – meaning “conception” – meaning “conception” – which is what most Israeli theorists have been explaining after the outbreak of war on October 7. This doctrine is the conclusion of Israeli military officials (especially because the Strip is still affiliated with the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the Office of the Coordinator), intelligence (especially since the Strip is the most important source of resistance and takes a great effort from the Israeli intelligence services), and politicians (the government that regulates the relationship with the Strip).
The doctrine that formulated the Israeli government’s vision towards the Strip consists of two parts:
First, Hamas has sunk, as Israel saw it, in the dissolution of “governance,” and has become militarily deterred while benefiting from the benefits of power in the Strip. Based on this part of the Israeli doctrine, Israel allowed the entry of Qatari funds, later allowed the entry of workers, and made sure that electricity was not cut or reduced from the Strip. All at a time when Israel’s military tours towards the Strip have been getting stronger every time, with the aim of entrenching the concept of “calm versus calm.”
The second part of the doctrine is related to the two-state solution, and is based on a principle agreed upon by all international players, especially the US administration, which is the impossibility of moving forward with the “two-state solution option” in the absence of a unified Palestinian leadership between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
While Israeli governments have been wrapping this doctrine with the phrase “calm versus calm,” it is important to delve deeper into the two sides of this doctrine that prevailed before October 7 as a reference to try to understand how Israel can shape the future of the Strip the day after the war.
Has the Israeli doctrine that prevailed before October 7 failed?
Since October 7, an Israeli political or military analyst, or even a high-ranking official, has barely featured a mention of the failure of the doctrine that governed the behavior of the Israeli military, intelligence, or political establishment. However, there is a flattening of the concept of doctrine as presented by Israeli analysts. And the flatness lies in that they only deal with the first part of the faith (Hamas, steeped in the pleasures of power and militarily deterred). Analysts rarely explicitly point out that this fissure (which Israel does not dispute its failure) is an indispensable “tool” that Israel uses to achieve the second tier of doctrine (a split postpones the two-state solution until further notice).
Hence, it should be noted that the continuation of the Palestinian political division between the West Bank and between the Gaza Strip (or between the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas Authority) in the period before October 7, provided a comfortable time frame during which Israel was able to accelerate the change of facts related to the West Bank and the expansion of settlements.
What does the Israeli doctrine towards the Gaza Strip mean for the two-state solution?
When the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip ends, and regardless of the results of this war militarily and on the ground, an urgent question will return to stand before Israel: How does Israel shape its political relationship with the Palestinians? The answer to this question is clearly about the outcome of the war and this paper does not seek to foresee scenarios. However, there is nothing to prevent Israel from taking this question into account on the cabanat table when formulating the objectives of the war.
It must be noted that the political future of the Palestinian issue, for Israel, meant until the following October 7:
Under the international Palestinian-Israeli understandings resulting from the Oslo Accords, Israel treats the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single unit (both under the command of the IDF and are regulated at the stage of the “two-state option” through the Office of the Coordinator).
Under the Palestinian-Israeli-international understandings stemming from the Oslo Accords, the political future of Palestinians in the occupied territory (i.e., the West Bank and the Strip together) invokes the “intenance” of reaching a two-state solution, provided that, for right-wing Israeli governments, this intention is not linked to a timetable or implementation steps.
What contributes to dropping the path of the “two-state solution” from the political agenda of Israeli governments since 2007 is the presence of two Palestinian governments or authorities in dispute between them (in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip). The lack of unified leadership for both the West Bank and the Strip was, it seems, the cornerstone of neglecting the negotiating track for Israel, just as it was the cause of the international community’s lack of enthusiasm to pressure Israel to put such a path into action.
The constant and the shift in the Israeli faith
Apparently, the only constant in the Israeli dealings with the sector was the item related to maintaining the Palestinian division, especially since Israeli governments have become “involved,” in the words of Israeli critics, in the Oslo Accords and its entitlements. Although the equation of “calm for calm” turned into a semi-permanent policy against the Gaza Strip, the years in which Netanyahu did not head the government (from March 2021 to November 2022), suggested that there were signs of an Israeli shift that was pushed towards by Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid at the time. According to Lapid, in one of his speeches, he presented a new vision that has not yet developed into a formal government action program, which is to replace the equation of “calm for calm” with the equation of “economy for calm.” 1] Lapid’s vision was to turn the Gaza Strip into “Singapore of the Middle East,” so that the new equation would increase Israel’s chances of managing the Strip according to the logic of “stick and carrot”: that is, military attack in exchange for economic growth, instead of military attack versus military calm (Netanyahu’s policy).
It can be said that one of the most important dilemmas that stand before Israel in light of the current war is the political future of the Strip if Hamas is absent from the political scene of the Strip. This dilemma must be understood in the context of the existence of the Oslo understandings, and the desire of the international community to move forward on the path of the “two-state solution”.
In an official White House statement on November 5, the United States expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of a clear Israeli vision for the day after the end of the war (on the American-Israeli assumption that Hamas will no longer be able to continue to rule). This uncertainty in the political future of the Strip may pose a challenge for Israel in terms of the “fixed” in its previous policies: exploiting the situation in which the Palestinian political divide continues.
Walid Habbas I am a Palestinian PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a researcher at the Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies in Ramallah.