The first 100 days of the Israeli war against Gaza: In the most prominent diagnoses and conclusions

By: Antoine Shlaht, Palestinian political analyst 

By: Antoine Shlaht, Palestinian political analyst 

Perhaps the first thing we encountered in the context of the total of the first 100 days of the Israeli war against Gaza, which ended yesterday, Sunday (January 14, 2024), is that there is a different tone that overshadows most of the analyses related to the results achieved so far in the context of this war, and it is a tone in which a greater amount of disappointment and perhaps bitterness due to the large gap between what was actually achieved and the goals set by the government for the war, which are increasingly characterised as very ambitious and unrealistic goals.

There is also frequent talk about a loss and even a defeat, which needs to be addressed in the future.

In most of these analyses, there is a reservation of the bloated meanings and monotonous language of most politicians. This reservation is relatively large if it is measured by what it was at the start of the war.

The following is a presentation and analysis of the most prominent diagnoses and conclusions of these analyses:

First, the continuation of the war remains the surest path to the safety of the coalition of Netanyahu’s Sixth Government:

One of the most prominent diagnoses remains that the diagnosis, which believes that the continuation of the war, despite the broad agreement that it may have exhausted itself in terms of achieving the goals set by the government, and mainly the elimination of the rule of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and its military strength in addition to the return of Israeli detainees, is the safest path for the safety of the coalition of the current Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government, although it does not lead to any stable end, and does not ensure the achievement of the goals of the war in general, as confirmed by Major General Tamir Hayman, former head of the Military Intelligence Division (“AMAN”) and the current director of the “National Security Research Institute” at Tel Aviv University. There are also hints in many Israeli analyses that prevailing estimates in the United States are that Netanyahu puts his political interests even above vital American interests, and definitely above President Joe Biden’s electoral interests.

At this point, we have to point out that the cessation of the war could, among other things, cause the Otzma Yehudit Party, led by Homeland Security Minister Itmar Ben-Gvir, and the “Religious Zionism” party led by Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich, to emerge from the coalition and the fall of the government. Not to mention, the continued survival of the “official camp” coalition led by Benny Gantz in government is subject to the continuation of the war.

In this regard, it is important to emphasise at the same time, that despite the existence of some differences in the leadership of the government, especially in the “war cabinet” (most notably the dispute between Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Galant), the consensus on the continuation of the war against Gaza and perhaps in parallel with the agreement to change its form by launching what is described as the “third phase” of it, is still a tyranny of all the vehicles of the government coalition, the opposition, the security establishment, and the Israeli public opinion.

Nor is there any weighty Israeli force, political, social or economic, that rebels against this consensus. The voices calling for a stop to the war have been confined to a few individuals, and among the family of Israeli detainees, voices that do not reverberate with decision-makers, and do not affect their decisions.

We should not be deprected from the account that the conditions in which Israel launched this war were excellent on its part, and they are mainly caused by the existence of a favourable regional and international climate, as confirms in the evening morning, and at the same time, stressing that this does not mean that these conditions may be repeated in future wars, whether against the Gaza Strip, or against other fronts such as Lebanon.

Second, the confrontation with Hezbollah continues until further notice:

What is said regarding the Israeli war against Gaza applies to the status quo on the northern front within the border area with Lebanon where the military confrontation and exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah continue. According to the statements of the leaders of the military and security establishment, foremost of which are the latest statements issued by the Chief of the Israeli Army General Staff, General Herzi Halevi, as well as according to most Israeli analyses, this situation will continue until further notice, against the background of Hezbollah’s announcement that it will not stop the confrontation until the end of the war launched by Israel on the Gaza Strip.

A number of military analysts, including Alon Ben-David, a military analyst for Israeli TV channel 13, acknowledge that Hezbollah has succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on Israeli air traffic control units in Meron, and that this also caused heavy losses, it is also “represented in assassinations of officials that he did not expect to be carried out,” as he put it. In his view, Israel should assume that Hezbollah will upgrade its fighting capabilities in preparation for the next phase of the battle. If Israel has so far received limited strikes of Kornet-EM long-range anti-armour missiles, it can be assumed that it will soon face other advanced anti-armour missiles.

It should also be noted that analysts close to Netanyahu are promoting the need for the confrontation with Hezbollah to continue and the possibility of its expansion, arguing that this party is one of Iran’s proxies in the Middle East and that the latter prepares it to occupy Israel and distract from it when it makes its decision on proceeding with the production of the first nuclear bomb, as written in the Maariv newspaper on Sunday by Yacov Nagel, the former president of the Israeli National Security Council, and researcher Andrea Stricker.

Third, Israel has no actual deterrence since before the 1967 war:

Throughout the first 100 days of the war, there was frequent talk about the Israeli deterrent force that received Najla’s stab following the attack by Hamas against Israeli military positions and against the population in what is known as the “Gaza envelope” in the southern region on October 7, 2023. The issue of restoring deterrence remains one of the most important goals that many, especially among former security officials, are insisting on. The first thing that comes to me when talking about the Israeli deterrent force is repeated is an old assertion issued by an Israeli professor of political science in which he pointed out that Israel does not have an actual deterrent force since before the June 1967 war. This war broke out despite the Israeli achievement in the war that preceded it (the Suez War in 1956). The war of attrition, in the late 1960s, also broke out despite Israel’s military achievements in that June war. This ruling extends to the October 1973 war, and to the ensuing wars and confrontations with the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Hezbollah, up to the second Lebanon war in 2006 and the Israeli wars against the Gaza Strip since 2008. Also, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan were not the result of the Israeli military deterrence, in the opinion of this professor. Moreover, even Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons “does not deter its enemies,” as he put it. However, Israel’s political and security institutions make no signs of an intention to stop gaving behind a military deterrent. It can even be said, without fear of falling into exaggeration, that they will remain engaged in this useless game.