Trump and the Gaza Conflict

Bottom Line Up Front:
* The incoming Trump administration will struggle to overcome remaining gaps between Hamas and Israel that continue to hinder efforts to reach a settlement.
* Trump’s threats of severe consequences for Hamas if it does not release all hostages before his inauguration have not led to any major breakthroughs in the talks.
* There are no clear avenues for the Trump administration to add military or other forms of pressure on Hamas to soften its demands.
* Trump is unlikely to compel the Israeli government to establish Palestinian governance in Gaza or prod it to support the formation of an independent Palestinian state.

Both outgoing and incoming U.S. foreign policy officials are seeking to resolve the 15-month-long conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip prior to the change of U.S. administrations on January 20. Sitting U.S. officials have accelerated diplomacy, building on existing proposals to try to close the few but still highly significant gaps between Israeli and Hamas positions. Encouraged by the successful negotiations of the Israel-Hezbollah settlement (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-november-27/) and the fall of the Assad regime (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-december-9/) , U.S. officials still hope to reach a Gaza ceasefire accord before President Biden leaves office. Doing so would enable the Biden national security team to claim it had calmed the region that was sent into turmoil by the October 7, 2023 Hamas incursion into Israel.

In early December, President-elect Trump, not yet in control of the official U.S. diplomatic machinery, sought to force Hamas to compromise by issuing what experts interpreted as an implicit threat of direct U.S. intervention on the side of Israel. Specifically, he stated on his Truth Social account on December 2 that there would be “all hell to pay” (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-december-17/) if Hamas did not release the 100 Israeli and dual-national hostages held in Gaza by the time he returns to the White House. Of that amount, at least 30 are believed to be deceased, and four were seized before the October 7 attack.

Although some experts asserted that Trump’s threat, coupled with the setbacks to Iran and its Axis of Resistance (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-april-30/) , added pressure on Hamas, a Gaza deal has continued to elude current U.S. officials. According to mediators, talks had again hit an impasse as of early January. The pessimistic forecast represents a change in sentiment since National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s mid-December meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in Israel, after which Sullivan stated a hostage release and cease-fire deal in Gaza was virtually at hand. Sullivan’s statement reflected Hamas’ reported dropping of its demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza before any hostages were released. He and other mediators described the potential agreement as a phased process, starting with a 60-day ceasefire period that would see the release of up to 30 living Israeli hostages and the release of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners
held by Israel.

Since the Sullivan trip, Israel and Hamas representatives have accused each other of withdrawing concessions that were previously offered. Hamas has apparently gotten its list together of 34 hostages that would be exchanged as part of a ceasefire deal, although the group has not presented mediators with the list, saying it needs more time and a pause in fighting to confirm their locations and conditions. Hamas also apparently has revived its demand for a path to an end to the war. Diplomats note that Israel is insisting that it receive only living hostages in any exchange and refuses to approve the release of some of the Palestinian detainees sought by Hamas. Despite the waning prospects for a pre-inauguration solution, mediators reported that some new Israeli and Hamas flexibility enabled talks to resume on Friday in Qatar, which has been a key interlocutor throughout the post-October 7 negotiations process.

The diplomatic roadmap to finalizing an Israel-Hamas pact might become less clear if no settlement is reached before Trump retakes office. Although some diplomats acknowledge that Trump’s threat against Hamas instilled greater urgency on the part of the group to reach a solution, experts assess that the warning cannot easily translate into steps that would seal an accord. Some interpreted Trump’s threat as suggesting his administration might intervene militarily in the conflict against Hamas – a decision that would directly contradict numerous statements by Trump and his advisors that have rejected new U.S. military involvement in the region.

The U.S. has provided intelligence to Israel during the conflict, most notably in helping track the locations of key figures such as top Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-18/) who Israel killed in October in the southern Gaza city of Rafah. U.S. forces constructed a pier attached to the Gaza beach to accelerate deliveries of humanitarian aid, but the effort involved no combat or clashes and was abandoned after rough seas repeatedly destroyed the structure. To date, no U.S. forces have joined Israeli operations in Gaza, but U.S. officials have continued to resupply Israeli forces with munitions and other military equipment used in the enclave.

It is far from clear that a Trump administration decision to intervene in the Gaza conflict – if that is the intent of the Trump warning – would succeed in accomplishing goals the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have not, such as rescuing additional hostages or defeating remaining Hamas fighters (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-22/) . U.S. airstrikes on Hamas militia fighters would severely damage U.S. relations with key Arab and other regional states and trigger global criticism of the U.S. for adding to the Palestinian civilian death toll. Some argue Trump’s threat intends to signal he will supply Israel with some of the heavier munitions that the Biden administration has withheld from Israel for being too costly to Palestinian civilian lives and not crucial for Israel’s operations. However, a Trump administration release of heavier munitions to Israel would not necessarily enable Israel to bring materially significant military pressure on Hamas that it is not already
applying.

Regional experts hope that Trump might use his close working relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to encourage him to accept compromises he has so far rejected. However, the history of their relationship suggests that Trump is more likely to endorse the prime minister’s existing positions – particularly his insistence that Israeli operations in Gaza continue until Hamas’ military and political infrastructure in Gaza is eliminated. During his initial term as president, Trump sharply cut U.S. humanitarian and other aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA)-led West Bank (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-november-7/) , asserting the PA supported acts of violence against Israel and was rife with corruption. Netanyahu has used these same arguments to justify his opposition to a return to PA rule in the post-war Gaza Strip.

Netanyahu has maintained his stance even though the Israeli security establishment agrees with their U.S. counterparts that the only viable means for preventing Hamas from returning to power there is for Israel to work with non-Hamas Palestinians, particularly the PA, to govern and secure the enclave. U.S. and regional officials assert the PA can be reformed to the point where it could successfully govern the Gaza population and draw support away from Hamas, whose popularity has, according to available data, been falling as the war in Gaza has continued to destroy the territory. PA officials point to their confrontation with Hamas fighters on the West Bank in December as evidence of the Authority’s willingness and ability to work with Israel to prevent Palestinian-run areas from harboring militants.

More broadly, current U.S. officials, as have successive U.S. administrations, assert that a permanent end to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, including in Gaza, requires an overall Israeli-Palestinian settlement and the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In his initial term, Trump delegated his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to formulate a plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace based on economic incentives for West Bank Palestinians. However, the plan skirted the core issues of Israel-Palestine borders, the return of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem and did not gain traction with PA leaders. Trump’s directive of moving the U.S. Embassy (https://thesoufancenter.org/the-us-recognizes-jerusalem-as-israels-capital/) from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – thereby recognizing the city as Israel’s capital – earned his administration the distrust of Palestinians, who insist Jerusalem be the capital of a future Palestinian state. Trump has not, either in the Kushner plan or
in any separate comments, pledged to follow the decades-long U.S. policy (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-november-12/) of supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state, although, during the 2024 campaign, he did not specifically rule that outcome out.

Yet, Trump will likely need to modify his stance on the Palestinians if his second administration is to accomplish a key goal – expanding the 2020 Abraham Accords (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-november-7/) his first administration brokered. Under that pact, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan normalized relations with Israel. Trump and his aides hailed the Accords as a seminal accomplishment that would positively restructure the Middle East, particularly if the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could be brought into it. However, Saudi Arabia’s de-facto leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), another ally of the first Trump administration, has firmly conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood. Faced with Saudi resistance to joining the Accords, the second Trump administration might try to accommodate the Saudi and broader regional position on eventual Palestinian statehood. Still, experts and polling data assess that
the October 7 Hamas attack has, at least for now, significantly diminished support in Israel for a Palestinian state under almost any conceivable conditions.

The Soufan Center

 

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