TRUMP PUSHES ISRAEL & HAMAS TO END GAZA WAR

The Trump foreign policy team is undertaking an all-out diplomatic effort to translate Iran’s strategic setbacks (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-30/) into broader conflict resolution in the Middle East. The team’s efforts, in the wake of an Israel-Iran ceasefire, are centered on ending the war in the Gaza Strip, in which entrenched positions held by Israeli and Hamas leaders have frustrated U.S. and regional mediators since a previous ceasefire and hostage release unraveled in February. Calling on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drop objections and conditions that have thwarted recent ceasefire mediation efforts, on Sunday, Trump posted on his social media platform Truth Social, “Make the deal in Gaza. Get the hostages back!!!”

Perceiving the Iran-Israel ceasefire (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-24/) provided momentum toward a Gaza deal, Trump and his aides delivered optimistic predictions. In the Oval Office last Friday, Trump told reporters, “I think it’s close,” when asked how close his administration is to a Gaza ceasefire deal. He added, apparently referring to top U.S. negotiator on Gaza and on Iran Steve Witkoff: “I just spoke with some of the people involved … We think within the next week we’re going to get a ceasefire.” On Tuesday, Trump told Axios media that he planned to speak to Netanyahu and be “very firm” about ending the war in Gaza and bringing the hostages home. Trump reiterated his prediction that a ceasefire deal would be reached within a week.

The U.S. pressure prompted Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, Netanyahu’s closest aide, to hastily arrange a visit to Washington this week to meet Special Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, other officials, and some members of the U.S. Congress. Dermer’s meetings yesterday were intended to ensure that a Trump-Netanyahu meeting at the White House on Monday will achieve full U.S.-Israel alignment on a Gaza settlement (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-2/) as well as a path forward to ensure Iran cannot rebuild (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-26/) its nuclear program. Following Dermer’s meetings on Tuesday, Trump posted the following on his Truth Social account: “My Representatives had a long and productive meeting with the Israelis today on Gaza. Israel has agreed to the necessary conditions to finalize the 60 Day CEASEFIRE, during which time we will work with all parties to end the War. The Qataris and Egyptians, who have worked very hard to help
bring Peace, will deliver this final proposal. I hope, for the good of the Middle East, that Hamas takes this Deal, because it will not get better — IT WILL ONLY GET WORSE.”

Trump’s prediction that a Gaza deal will be reached is based on a confluence of several significant developments. The Trump team perceives that Netanyahu is willing to demonstrate greater flexibility on Gaza in appreciation for Trump’s decision to use its unique “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” (MOP) (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-23/) on Iran’s hardened uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. The U.S. strike inflicted damage on Iran’s nuclear program that Israel’s Air Force could not and aligned the U.S. with the goal of ensuring, through military force if necessary, that Iran cannot construct a nuclear device. And, growing domestic and global criticism of an open-ended Israeli war effort that has failed to dismantle Hamas or bring back all Israeli hostages is adding pressure on Netanyahu to accede to U.S. suggestions to develop a Gaza “day after” plan.

Further fueling Trump’s optimism, U.S. and Israeli officials have apparently agreed on a ceasefire and war termination plan that incorporates many, although not all, of the demands of both Hamas and Israel. The basic elements are similar to those of past proposals, including providing for a 60-day ceasefire during which 10 living and 15 deceased Israelis would be released in the early days of the truce, though the exact timing is not yet determined. In exchange, Palestinian militants would be freed by Israel, based on the criteria used in past ceasefire deals. Hamas would be required to provide full details on the remaining hostages (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-november-6/) , and the Red Cross would be granted access to them to provide medical assistance. Humanitarian supplies would increase throughout the Gaza Strip, including in Hamas-controlled areas. Israel is insisting on international oversight to prevent Hamas from diverting aid, and distribution of supplies by the
newly operational, Israeli-controlled Gaza Humanitarian Foundations (GHF) centers would also continue. Hamas objects to any continuation of the GHF mechanism, demanding instead a return to exclusive use of the previous, UN-supervised humanitarian aid system.

Trump and his aides appear to have prevailed on Netanyahu to accept specific plans for postwar governance and security in Gaza that would pave the way for an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-april-29/) exit from Gaza and an end to the war. A firm commitment to a termination of the conflict and an IDF withdrawal has been a consistent core demand of Hamas leaders. The new U.S.-Israel plan reportedly provides for a partial and gradual IDF withdrawal, contingent on progress in the final-status negotiations. The U.S. would provide guarantees, including a commitment from Trump himself to continue the ceasefire and talks after 60 days, even if no deal is finalized. A recent addition to the plan is that hostage releases would also continue as long as negotiations are ongoing. The plan accommodates Netanyahu’s mistrust of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA), which is dominated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its main faction,
Fatah. Netanyahu has consistently and forcefully objected to any plan that returns PLO-linked leaders to Gaza to govern after the war. To circumvent that roadblock, the new U.S.-Israel proposal envisions a multinational force consisting of U.S. and Arab troops assuming security and policing responsibilities in Gaza. Two Arab states frequently mentioned as potential providers of force contingents are Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Experts and regional officials note that the U.S.-Israel plan immediately faced obstacles, aside from Hamas’ objections to some of its main elements. Saudi and other Arab Gulf state officials have told journalists that Arab leaders are hesitant to conduct counter-insurgency missions (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-22/) against Hamas, which is likely to resist Arab security forces as enforcers of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. To try to address that concern, U.S., Israel, and Arab mediators are reportedly planning to introduce the proposed U.S.-Arab security force into Gaza gradually, neighborhood by neighborhood, where local clans and militant operatives would be expected to hand over weapons for safekeeping. Some officials note the plan does not adequately address Hamas’ refusal to completely disarm. The group’s leaders have already ruled out surrendering maps of the Hamas tunnel networks and its heavy weaponry, including rockets, mortars, and
explosives. The U.S.-Israel proposal also contains a condition Hamas leaders consider non-negotiable – that the organization’s remaining leadership in Gaza would leave the territory for exile, receiving Israeli safe passage to do so. On the other hand, the issue of postwar governance appears soluble. In previous sets of talks, Hamas has accepted that it will have to cede political power in order to obtain a termination of the war. Mediators from Egypt, Qatar, and other Arab states have stated that the group is willing to yield to a non-partisan technocratic Gaza government, although some reports suggest that the group demands representation in an interim Gaza governing body.

Yet, it appears that Trump’s hopes for a deal might again falter over Hamas’ perception that the new plan still does not guarantee an end to the conflict and a full Israeli withdrawal. A brief and unofficial statement yesterday by senior Hamas official Taher al-Nunu confirmed it had received a proposal from mediators and is holding talks with them to “bridge gaps” to return to the negotiating table. The group stated it is willing to free the remaining 50 Israeli hostages, living and deceased, but only in exchange for an end to the conflict. The statement was not an outright rejection of the Israel-U.S. plan, but its response was similar to those it issued after receiving all proposals that stopped short of guaranteeing Israel would fully withdraw. A Hamas delegation was expected to meet with Egyptian and Qatari mediators (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-2/) in Cairo on Wednesday to discuss the proposal, according to an Egyptian official, but there were no indications the
group was considering altering any of its core positions to accept the plan.

If the current diplomatic flurry does not yield a breakthrough, U.S. and regional mediators might assess that the recent Israel-Iran conflict and U.S. strike on Iran did not alter the fundamental calculations of Israeli and Hamas leaders to the extent they had hoped. And, without a resolution of the Gaza conflict, Trump’s team will likely be unable to even begin the process of recruiting additional Arab states to join the landmark Abraham Accords (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-september-14/) . Some reports suggest the Israel-U.S. truce draft indirectly references the establishment of official ties between Israel and additional Arab states as “diplomatic compensation” for Israel if it withdraws completely from Gaza. Expanding the Accords is a goal the Trump team enthusiastically articulated as soon as the Iran-Israel ceasefire took effect, but the challenges to achieving that objective remain significant.