Trump to concede to the an alternative ARAB LEADERS PLAN on Gaza

Bottom Line Up Front:
* Arab leaders are convening to finalize an Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza, developed to counter President Trump’s suggestions to displace Gaza’s population during its reconstruction.
* Trump has indicated he will defer to the Arab plan, judging his suggestions motivated regional leaders to address U.S. concerns by assuming responsibility for postwar Gaza.
* A core provision – and potential pitfall – of the Arab plan is the establishment of a governing body composed of technocrats aligned with neither Hamas nor the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA).
* Critics assert the plan sidesteps Hamas’ refusal to disarm – a demand Israeli leaders consider a non-negotiable.

President Trump’s team assesses his controversial suggestion to relocate the entire Gaza population, to facilitate reconstruction of the devastated enclave, motivated Arab leaders to develop an acceptable alternative. Some argue that Trump’s intent, all along, was to stimulate major Arab stakeholders to assume responsibility for postwar Gaza. Trump and his team are set to back an Egypt-drafted plan, which will be finalized in a series of summit meetings that began in Saudi Arabia on Friday. The gathering was attended, at the leadership or heir-apparent level, by Bahrain, Qatar, the Unitxed Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt. A finalized plan will reportedly be unveiled at an Arab League emergency summit in Cairo on March 4. The formulation of the plan appears designed to provide details for implementation of phases two and three of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and war termination agreement reached in late January – major aspects of which were left vague in the formal
pact documents.

In a telephone media interview on Friday, Trump appeared to concede to the Egyptian plan, saying he had failed to persuade (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-february-13/) Egypt and Jordan to accept displaced Gazans, rendering his preferred option unworkable. Trump stated: “Well, we pay Jordan and Egypt billions of dollars a year [in U.S. foreign aid]. And I was a little surprised they’d say that [refuse to accept Gaza refugees], but they did…I’ll tell you, the way to do it is my plan. I think that’s the plan that really works. But I’m not forcing it. I’m just going to sit back and recommend it.”

The apparent demise of Trump’s controversial plans for postwar Gaza (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-november-7/) will shift attention to, and focus scrutiny on, the plan drafted by Egypt. The elements of that plan, as reported in a wide variety of regional sources, seem to address all aspects of governance, security, and reconstruction of postwar Gaza. On the surface, the Egyptian draft seems to address at least the core elements of Israel’s demands that Hamas no longer plays a role in governing or securing the enclave. However, Israeli and other critics argue that Egyptian and Arab officials are downplaying or overlooking Hamas leaders’ intent to resist being marginalized politically and militarily.

The crux of the Egyptian draft, as it stands currently, envisions the League of Arab States naming a national Palestinian committee of technocrats and community leaders unaffiliated with Hamas to govern postwar Gaza and supervise its rebuilding. According to the Associated Press, the Egyptian plan assigns no governing role for either Hamas or officials linked to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Excluding the PA, which is dominated by the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from postwar Gaza governance appears to defer to Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s insistence (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-february-10/) that the PA is rife with corruption and tacitly supports acts of violence against Israelis.

According to the Egyptian plan, as governance and security take hold in the enclave, Egypt and its regional partners will establish “secure areas” equipped with mobile houses and shelters to house the Gaza population. Much of the population urgently needs housing because of the destruction of a large percentage of the buildings and homes in the territory. The draft outlines a redistribution of residential areas, including reducing population density in northern Gaza and establishing low-population “safe zones” near Israeli border communities. Meanwhile, according to the draft, Egyptian and international construction firms will begin to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-february-18/) over the coming 10 years. The plan budgets $20 billion for reconstruction in the first three years, to be provided by the wealthier Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar. Yet, a complete rebuilding of Gaza, as well as the occupied West Bank,
will require more than $50 billion, according to a joint assessment by the United Nations, European Union, and World Bank, released on Tuesday.

The plan tries to address Israeli security concerns by recommending the establishment of a police force made up of PA policemen who remained in Gaza after 2007 when Hamas won legislative elections and took control of the enclave. The proposal also includes restrictions on Hamas and other Palestinian armed factions but provides only for “monitoring” armed groups – and not for completely disarming them. According to sources, Egypt has proposed designated weapons storage sites in Gaza for arms collected from militant groups to be overseen by European and Egyptian monitors. To manage local security and governance disputes, Egypt’s plan will establish an Arab-led committee, which would function as an extension of the existing Egyptian-Qatari committee overseeing the return of displaced Gazans to the northern half of the Strip. Additionally, according to regional sources, an American security firm currently active at several Gaza checkpoints would continue to operate at three key contact points
between Gaza and Israel.

The draft plan has begun to attract regional and global support as a preferable alternative to Trump’s proposal and is seen as a step toward circumventing Netanyahu’s failure to delineate a postwar Gaza plan to date. However, critics note that it remains unclear whether key elements of the plan can overcome anticipated resistance from the two main antagonists, Israel and Hamas. Egyptian officials argue Hamas has already indicated a willingness to cede any postwar governance role. They point to, among other indicators, a statement by Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qasim to Riyadh-based Al Arabiya TV: “It is not necessary for Hamas to be part of the political and administrative arrangements in the next phase for Gaza, especially if it serves the interests of our people.” Hamas made the conciliatory statement as negotiations toward phase two of the ceasefire are set to begin in early March after weeks of delay.  Egyptian officials (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-july-17/) told
region-focused media outlets that Hamas agreed to cede a role in governing Gaza, in part, because the draft plan does not transfer Hamas’ governance role to senior PA officials from the West Bank. That stance reflects the historic rivalry between the two Palestinian factions for dominance within the Palestinian national movement. At the same time, PA leaders reportedly have withheld their support for the Egyptian draft because it excludes them from a role in postwar Gaza.

Israeli and other skeptics of the Egyptian draft insist the plan falls short of ensuring that Hamas is completely disarmed in postwar Gaza. To date, Hamas leaders (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-january-16/) have not indicated a willingness to give up their weaponry, and the Egyptian plan does not clearly provide for an Arab or other security force that would combat Hamas or other militant insurgents seeking to undermine the enclave’s postwar government. Israeli officials have reportedly argued the plan also fails to address Israel’s insistence on overseeing Gaza’s reconstruction, fearing its delegation of oversight to regional actors could facilitate a resurgence of Hamas’ military strength. Egypt’s plan reportedly calls for construction materials to enter Gaza through Rafah, on the Egypt-Gaza border, instead of through Kerem Shalom, a border crossing between Israel and Gaza that could be easily monitored by Israeli authorities.

Reflecting the balancing any plan needs to incorporate, the Egyptian draft tries to satisfy Arab leadership demands that any long-term solution for Gaza and the broader Middle East provide for the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The second stage of the Egyptian plan, according to reports, moves toward that goal by providing for discussions on connecting Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. However, Israeli leaders oppose any postwar plans that would pave the way to a two-state solution. All available polling data suggests that the October 7, 2023, Hamas incursion into Israel has reduced, not expanded, Israeli support for a two-state solution (https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-may-13/) . Trump senior officials have not expressed support for establishing a Palestinian state, citing the October 7 attack and other events and developments as rendering that outcome non-viable. It also remains an open question whether the Arab leaders will be willing to invest
many billions of dollars to reconstruct Gaza amid uncertainty that warfare in Gaza has ended permanently. Still, by addressing most of the major outstanding issues, the Egyptian plan might find enough support to achieve adoption and implementation. If the plan falters, the likelihood is that Israeli leaders insist on an enduring security role in the territory, which guarantees continued fighting there.